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In this paper I discuss the nature of the political constraints that the
World Bank faces in delivering basic services to the poor. The main
problem arises because the Bank has to work through domestic govern-
ments which have political aims different from helping the poor. The
conceptual approach attractive to economists and central to much re-
cent thinking in the World Bank, particularly the 2004 World Develop-
ment Report, is the notion of “politician proofing”. Given that political
incentives derail good policies, how can those policies be politician-
proofed? I argue that evidence and theory suggests that such an ap-
proach is ultimately futile, basically because we simply do not understand
the relevant political incentives. I discuss alternative policy strategies
and conclude that what is required is a much more fundamental assess-
ment of what type of political equilibria deliver services to the poor. As
I illustrate with the case of Botswana: once the political equilibrium is
right, everything goes right and politician proofing is redundant.
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En este documento se discute la naturaleza de las restricciones políticas
que enfrenta el Banco Mundial en la provisión de servicios básicos a
los pobres. El problema principal surge de la necesidad que tiene el
Banco de trabajar a través de los gobiernos locales quienes tienen
objetivos políticos diferentes a los de ayudar a los pobres. La perspectiva
conceptual atractiva para los economistas, y que también es central
en gran parte del pensamiento del Banco Mundial, en particular el
Informe de Desarrollo Mundial de 2004, es la noción de implementar
políticas “a prueba de políticos”. Dado que los incentivos políticos
desencarrilan las buenas políticas, ¿Cómo pueden hacerse dichas políticas
“a prueba de políticos”? Se sostiene que la evidencia y la teoría sugieren
que dicho enfoque es inútil, básicamente porque no entendemos los
incentivos políticos relevantes. Se discuten estrategias alternativas de
política y se concluyé que es necesaria una comprensión más profunda
de qué clases de equilibrios políticos proveen servicios a los pobres. Como
se ilustra en el caso de Bostwana, una vez el equilibrio político es el
apropiado, todo funciona bien y las políticas “a prueba de políticos”
son redundantes.
Clasificación JEL: D02, D72, H5, O19.
Introduction
The aim of the World Bank is to reduce world poverty. With this aim
it lends money to developing countries and supports redistribution
towards and investment in the poor. To deliver these policies it relies
on the sovereign governments in various countries. Unfortunately,
these governments typically have different objectives than the World
Bank. For example, governments wish to be re-elected and stay in
power, but this is irrelevant for the World Bank. Much experience
suggests that these differences in objective functions lead domestic
governments to choose policies which are different from those de-
signed by the World Bank.
What policies? The most central ones are discussed, for example, in
the 2004 World Development Report (WDR 2004). The focus is on
services for the poor. These include investing in schools and educa-55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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tion, building hospitals and clinics, engaging in public health pro-
grams such as immunization, providing crucial public goods such as
sanitation, sewage and clean water, and doing other things like elec-
trification. The government is involved in these activities for the classi-
cal reason that there are endemic market failures. Poor people underinvest
in education because there are imperfect capital markets and they can-
not borrow against the future (Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Baland
and Robinson, 2000), because there are positive externalities from edu-
cation, and because educational provision involves the provision of
public goods, such as schools and books. Poor people underinvest in
other types of public goods such as sewage and the provision of port-
able water. For reasons well articulated in welfare economics there is
therefore an important role for the public sector in improving the wel-
fare of the poor by attacking these market failures. The goal of the World
Bank is to encourage and support such interventions.
Unfortunately, there is a large gap between welfare economics and
reality. Governments do not just solve market failures, they have their
own objectives and they reward their supporters and penalize their
opponents. I call a deviation from the policies dictated by a social
planning problem a political pathology. Given that such pathologies
exist, government policy will deviate from what the World Bank thinks
is desirable and one has to consider the net effects of political failures
and market failures. Even when one considers an environment with
both market failures and political failures however, it is highly un-
likely that the optimum will be a corner solution with zero govern-
ment intervention (see Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). Government
intervention will be needed, the issue is how to make it more effective
given the political constraints.
In this paper I discuss the nature of the political incentives that leads
to the divergence between World Bank intentions and actual policy
outcomes. I then move to address what the World Bank can or should
do about it. Though throughout the paper I talk about the World Bank,
the lessons I draw are relevant to any independent body wishing to
influence and implement policies in developing countries. This could
be not just international financial institutions, but also the United
Nations or the Swedish government, or it could also be independent
think tanks and institutions.4 4 4 4 4
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The conceptual approach that I follow is that it is rational, calculat-
ing, Machiavellian political realities that are the main problem which
stops pro-poor policy being implemented. Of course in the real world
there is much uncertainty about the exact form that an optimal policy
could take. Consider educational policy. We do not know the answer
to questions such as; what is the optimal teacher-pupil ration? Never-
theless, the actual situation in many developing countries is that teach-
ers are absent, there are no books, or infrastructure is deteriorating.
There is no debate on the implications of these conditions or on meas-
ures to improve them. In other contexts there may be a lot of uncer-
tainty at the level of poor individuals about what their options are and
what it is best for them to do. This may well be true in contexts such
as sanitation and basic health care, or the implications of condom use
for the transmission of HIV. Nevertheless, since there is no real scien-
tific uncertainty about the benefits of these health interventions we’d
like to understand why governments repeatedly fail to make them. I
try to understand why the political pressures net out in the way they
do. There are several conclusions of my study.
(1) The main problem with pro-poor policies is that the political in-
centives of client governments to redistribute are not aligned with
the aims of the World Bank.
(2) Redistribution is targeted at people and groups which have desir-
able political characteristics, and these may be unrelated to the eco-
nomic characteristics (such as poverty) that motivate the World Bank.
(3 Worse, political incentives involve redistributing in forms that can
be narrowly targeted, implying that the collateral benefits to the
poor may be limited.
(4) Worse still, the nature of governance and more generally the po-
litical equilibrium in client countries is almost certainly endog-
enous to World Bank aid. Aid is intrinsically political.
What can be done about this? The World Bank has several meta alter-
natives. The first is to recognize that politicians are politicians and
design policies accordingly. This suggests, for instance, that narrowly
targeted policies, though attractive from a normative point of view, will
not do the job. Policies must be designed to be politician proof. How-
ever, if politician proofing is the intellectually most attractive solution,
it is also almost certainly useless in practice. By which I mean:55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD
5 5 5 5 5
• Designing complete contingent contracts when giving aid is in-
feasible. Neither academics nor the World Bank understands how
politics ‘works’ in Zambia or Colombia, so designing aid subject
to the constraints that politicians act rationally is impossible.
• Incentive contracts with imperfect understanding of the constraints
probably do more harm than good.
Given this, one strategy is to look for alternatives that are robust against
classes of political pathologies. Hopefully one can improve things
without a detailed understanding of the constraint set. A major candi-
date for a robust policy is.
• Universal, blunt policies that cannot be targeted.
If even this is infeasible then perhaps we have to face up to the fact
that in reality policy just cannot be made politician-proof.
If politician-proof aid is a chimera, or maybe counterproductive (I dis-
cuss examples) one possibility is to do nothing to make aid contingent,
simply hand it over. In this case the evidence suggests that aid improves
development outcomes when there is a ‘good’ government and has no
effect when there is a ‘bad’ government. However, even when aid has
no impact on developmental outcome it almost surely improves wel-
fare in poor countries and in some sense this is the ultimate goal.
Another clear possibility is:
• Go round the roadblock of domestic politics and attempt to use NGOs
or create parallel institutions to deliver services directly to the poor.
This approach has many problems, including further undermining in-
digenous state capacity.
Alternatively, the World Bank can consciously attempt to mould the
political equilibrium in ways that allow pro-poor policies to naturally
arise in equilibrium. This suggestion may sound outrageous, but actu-
ally there is much evidence that, like it or not, the World Bank does
alter the political equilibrium of the countries that it deals with. In this
case it is much better to face up to it and consciously evaluate the
effects that one’s policies have. An obvious strategy for this is:6 6 6 6 6
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• Give the poor more political power.
Yet I worry that this may replace a pro-rich or pro-middle class politi-
cal pathology with an ultimately equally pernicious pro-poor pathol-
ogy (one thinks of the APRA government under Alan Garcia in Peru
in the 1980’s). A more attractive approach is:
• Change the incentives of politicians so as to change the whole
qualitative nature of the political equilibrium.
How on earth can such a goal be achieved? I discuss some relevant
and rather optimistic evidence. Though we are a long way from un-
derstanding exactly how this could be done I am not sure that we are
further from this than understanding how to politician-proof specific
policies. I argue more that this is the right perspective and I illustrate
it with a discussion of the political equilibrium in Botswana. When
you get the political equilibrium right, everything goes right and un-
derstanding the details is not crucial. Thus one should not aim to
achieve politician-proof policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I provide an over-
view of what the political science and political economy literature
has to say about the political logic of redistribution. I provide a tax-
onomy of some of the mechanisms that lead to political pathologies,
distinguishing between ex ante and ex post mechanisms. In the politi-
cal science literature the most studied class of pathologies comes un-
der the rubric of ‘clientelism’.
In section II I discuss what evidence there is to help us decide when
these different mechanisms come into play. What do we know about
the factors that determine actual political strategies? This is crucial
for the World Bank because if it wants to understand the implications
of its actions for the political equilibrium, and how this might be
changed, it needs to know what factors lead the political equilibrium
to be what it is. Section III discussed situations where ‘things go right’
which I shall argue is to crucial importance. In section IV I then ask
what can the World Bank do. I discuss the ideal of politician-proof
policies and the reasons I do not believe this is a useful way to think.
Section V concludes.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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I. Political Pathologies
The central problem with targeting policies at the poor is that politi-
cians may not have the correct incentives to implement the policies1.
There are two aspects to this, an ex ante one and an ex post one. In ex
ante terms, equilibrium policies chosen by politicians favor individu-
als or groups with desirable political characteristics, not desirable eco-
nomic characteristics. If the poor do not have the right political
characteristics then, ex ante, politicians will not have the right incen-
tives to design policies that benefit them. In ex post terms, politicians
may not find it optimal to implement the policies they promised to
introduce. This problem can only be solved by mechanisms of ac-
countability. If the poor do not have access to such mechanisms then
policy promises to them will not be honored.
Most of the academic literature is not specifically concerned with
particular services such as health or sanitation. Rather, it tends to fo-
cus on more general ‘redistribution’. Redistribution may be pure trans-
fers with no implications for efficiency or they may take the form of
public goods, either ‘general’ ones such a defense, or perhaps a clean
environment, or ‘local’ public goods.
A. Ex Ante
What political characteristics are seen to drive ex ante policy? There
are three basic questions: how much redistribution goes on, to whom,
and in what form?
B. How Much?
The question of how much is addressed in a large empirical literature,
recently re-evaluated by Persson and Tabellini (2003). They show using
cross-sectional data that the size of government in society (govern-
1 My reading of the comparative evidence leads me to focus on the incentives and constraints
of politicians and ignore other potentially important ‘political’ actors such as bureaucrats
(Niskanen, 1971) whose behavior may also derail World Bank policy. Focusing on these
actors and the agency relationships between politicians and bureaucrats is a highly
complementary topic.8 8 8 8 8
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ment spending as a % of GDP) is greater when old people are a greater
proportion of the population, the more democratic a country is, and
the more open the economy is (a result initially emphasized by Rodrik,
1998). They find that federal nations have lower spending other things
equal. Many other candidate covariates, such as ethno-linguistic
fragmentation, per-capita income, and income inequality are not ro-
bustly significant though appear to be statistically significant in some
specifications. They also consider a panel dataset thus exploiting time-
series variation and here find that in addition to the above results per-
capita income (Wagner’s Law) has a positive and significant coefficient.
C. To Whom?
More interesting for the present discussion is to whom. The formal
political economy literature finds that redistribution in democracies
is targeted at groups,
• Which are relatively numerous.
• Which are able to solve the collective action problem when others
are not (Bates, 1981, Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Section 3.5,
Grossman and Helpman, 2001).
• Who manage to form political parties while others do not (Wittman,
1983, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005).
• Who are un-ideological ‘swing or ‘floating’ voters (Lindbeck and
Weibull, 1987, Dixit and Londregan, 1996).
• Who are relatively well informed (Strömberg, 2004, Besley and
Burgess, 2002).
• Who turn out to vote in high numbers.
• Who are relatively poor (Dixit and Londregan, 1996).
• Who are in the same social network as politicians (Dixit and
Londregan, 1996, Robinson and Verdier, 2002).
To the extent that the poor do not have these characteristics we would
expect them to lose out in the determination of policy. Some of these
factors cut in opposite directions for the poor. For example, we know55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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that in general individual turnout in elections is positively related to
education and income. The higher is the relative turnout of a group,
the more attractive politically is it for politicians and the more likely
it is that they will design policies to favor such a group. This seems to
hurts the poor. Interestingly however, Campbell (2005) finds that with
respect to social security in the US, the poor who benefit from the
policies and who have larger stakes in making sure the policy contin-
ues than the rich beneficiaries, actually are more politically active. In
addition to turnout, the poor are likely to be less well informed than the
non-poor. Strömberg (2004) and Besley and Burgess (2002) have shown
how important the media is in redistributive politics. If the poor are
relatively uninformed, they tend to get less. On the other hand the poor
are relatively numerous and this cuts in the opposite direction.
Two other factors from the above list are almost certainly highly rel-
evant - the ability of groups to solve the collective action problem, and
the formation of political parties. Poor people are often relatively iso-
lated and are less organized collectively. Moreover, in a society such as
Colombia where the same two political parties have been sharing power
for 150 years, it may be hard for the voices of the poor to be heard.
The above list of factors are derived from formal models which place
voting and elections at the heart of policy determination. What about
non-democracies? There are few attempts to construct a theory of dic-
tatorships at the same level of the theory of democracy so it is quite
hard to draw out as many implications. Most (see Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2005, Chapter 5) start from the idea that in a dictatorship
some group chooses policy to maximize it’s own welfare subject to
the constraint that it stays in power. To stay in power a dictatorship
needs support and this support must be bought with policies, trans-
fers, favors etc. The base of this support may be very narrow how-
ever, and certainly narrower than the basis of support needed to sustain
a democratic regime. For example, many scholars argue that the re-
gime of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, West Africa, was able to stay in
power almost without a social base, and therefore without the need to
engage in patrimonialism. In this context Herbst (1993, p. 153) notes
that a consensus is that all rulers depend on the support of some social
group to stay in power. However,10 10 10 10 10
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“In Ghana, this simply was not true. The Rawlings regime was
placed in power through the efforts of part of the military and
managed to stay in power, in good part, because no influential
social group had the willingness and/or the ability to try to
affect who was in power”.
Though dictatorships clearly use repression much more than democ-
racies to stay in power the analytics of support may be related to the
analytics of democratic support. If this is right then there are some
important lessons from the above results. For instance, groups that
solve the collective action problem may be more of a threat to a dicta-
tor and therefore have to be bought off. They therefore benefit from
redistribution. Similarly, better informed groups may be more discon-
tented with the dictator’s policy and again may need to be bought off
(these ideas are certainly consistent with the study of agricultural poli-
cies under non-democratic regimes in Africa by Bates, 1981).
In contrast to the mechanisms outlined above, the political science
literature has focused on simple dichotomies to answer the ‘to whom’
question. Scholars make a distinction between policy which is ‘clien-
telistic’ and that which is ‘programmatic’ and these are conceived of
as two polar political strategies that parties or groups contesting power
might adopt. On the one hand, political parties can compete for sup-
port by offering different types of public goods which affect the entire
population. These policies might concern ideological issues, such as
human rights, or they may be more economic, such as law and order,
trade and macroeconomic policy, or regulatory regimes. On the other
hand, instead of focusing on such collective or public goods, parties
can concentrate on offering particularistic benefits or private goods to
groups of supporters. Shefter (1977, p. 403) provides a classic state-
ment of this dichotomy;
“A Political party may employ two basic strategies in its ef-
forts to induce voters to support its candidates. It may distrib-
ute divisible benefits-patronage of various sorts-to the
individuals who support the party. Alternatively, it may dis-
tribute collective benefits or appeal to a collective interest in
an effort to elicit...votes”.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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A more recent statement, Kitschelt (2000, pp. 845-846) distinguishes
between
“pursuit of policy programs that distribute benefits and costs
to all citizens regardless of whether they voted for the govern-
ment of the day or not (programmatic linkages). Alternatively,
does accountability and responsiveness have to do with deliv-
ering specific material advantages to a politicians’ electoral
supporters (clientelistic linkage)?”
The problems that the World Bank faces stem from precisely the fact
that clientelism is seen to plague developing countries. This is most
evident from the academic literature in African politics in which there
is a huge consensus that African politics can be described as clien-
telistic or ‘neo-patrimonial’ and subject to ‘personal rule’. Leonard
and Strauss (2003, p. 4) characterize this as the ‘personal-rule para-
digm’ (stemming from Rosberg and Jackman, 1982) noting that the
main implication is that,
“personal rule contributes to weak states. Procedures based on
loyalty, informal agreements, and personal relationships tend
to undermine a government’s ability to function effectively...
public resources tend to be used for patronage or private pur-
poses, resulting in a lack of public investment...The state is
not a tool for public development but for private ‘eating’ and
for rewarding support networks”.
From the point of view of the World Bank the key issue is that since
developing countries are seen to be clientelistic, under what circum-
stances might we expect the poor to be the clients of politicians? Cli-
entelistic politics is worse than programmatic politics, but conditional
on being in a clientelistic regime it is better to be a client than to be
completely excluded from patronage.
Unfortunately, there are few generalizations in the political science
literature on who clients are and it is difficult to draw any conclusions
about the circumstances under which such people are poor. The gen-
eral idea is that there is some extra-political relationship, possibly
economic, possibly social, that leads patrons to be matched with cli-12 12 12 12 12
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ents. One interesting way to link this literature to the political economy
literature discussed above is to see the formal model as generating
mechanisms that might help in identifying what sort of people or groups
are likely to be clients, the recipients of personalized redistribution.
D. In What Form?
A key issue is not simply how much redistribution and who gets it but the
form that this redistribution takes. One of the key problems for the deliv-
ery of services to the poor is that even in circumstances where the poor
have the right characteristics, political incentives may dictate that they
get redistribution in something other than the socially optimal form.
The study of the form of redistribution dates to the work of Stigler
(1971, 1972) and Becker (1976) in the 1970’s. They asked why there
are inefficiencies in the form of redistribution. For example, why re-
distribute to farmers by subsidizing the price of agricultural output.
This is socially inefficient since it keeps resources in agriculture that
could be better used elsewhere. From a social point of view, if farm-
ers have sufficient political power to get redistribution at all, the best
thing to do would be to transfer income to them. Recent research on
the form of redistribution has tried to elucidate political mechanisms
which might lead inefficient forms of redistribution to be politically
attractive. In the recent literature inefficiencies in the form of redistri-
bution may be motivated by a desire
• By politicians to conceal that they are really redistributing (Coate
and Morris, 1995).
• By politicians hoping to reduce the total amount of redistribution
that they have to undertake (Rodrik, 1986, Wilson, 1990, Becker
and Mulligan, 1998).
• By politicians because it helps them to create incentives for voters
to support them (Bates, 1981, Persson and Tabellini, 1999, Lizzeri
and Persico, 2000a, Robinson and Verdier, 2002, Robinson and
Torvik, 2005).
• By politicians because it allows them to take credit for policy and
influence the beliefs of voters about their preferences.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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• By politicians or interest groups because it allows them to lock in
redistribution or rents for the future (Echeverry, Fergusson and
Querubín, 2004).
• By interest groups benefitting from redistribution to maintain their
political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001).
• By interest groups because it influences the type of game (and
therefore the terms of trade) between them and politicians (Dixit,
Grossman and Helpman, 1997).
• By interest groups because it can help them solve the collective
action problem.
 A key finding in this literature is that even when the poor get stuff,
the form of that stuff is biased against public good provision or the
things that the World Bank might want to provide. This is again be-
cause of political incentives. The idea here is old but was brilliantly
illustrated by Robert Bates in his study of agricultural policy in Africa.
In his analysis of why governments persistently and inefficiently refuse
to pay market prices for agricultural goods, but instead choose to sub-
sidize fertilizer and state farms he notes (Bates 1981, p. 114),
“Were the governments of Africa to confer a price rise on all
rural producers, the political benefits would be low; for both
supporters and dissidents would secure the benefits of such a
measure, with the result that it would generate no incentives to
support the government in power. The conferral of benefits in
the form of public works projects, such as state farms, on the
other hand, has the political advantage of allowing the ben-
efits to be selectively apportioned. The schemes can be given
to supporters and withheld from opponents”.
His analysis isolates a key force influencing the form of redistribu-
tion. When redistribution is clientelistic it is important to target it to
specific people or groups. This idea has been elegantly formalized by
Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Lizzeri and Persico (2000a). It leads
to a generic underprovision of public goods because, by their defini-
tion, these are blunt and benefit all people.14 14 14 14 14
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Robinson and Verdier (2002) extend these ideas emphasizing that not
only are public goods non-targetable, they are provide non-exclud-
able benefits. This is not politically attractive when politicians want
to reward their clients only and exclude others from the benefits.
Moreover, if politicians are attempting to punish citizens who did not
support them, then they will tend to underprovide such goods.
Apart from these issues the other one which is central for the World
Bank is the connection between the form of redistribution and state
capacity. Though this issue is imperfectly understood (see Robinson
and Verdier, 2002), one of the most common inefficient instruments
is employment in the public sector or bureaucracy. There is overwhelm-
ing evidence that this is an endemic source of lack of state capacity
(see Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 2000, and Alesina, Danninger and
Rostagno, 2001). The reason for this is obvious, if employment is
governed by political criteria then employees cannot be given incen-
tives to work hard because they cannot be credibly threatened or sanc-
tioned. Thus typical incentive contracts won’t work. The political
science literature on clientelism and neo-patrimonialism takes it as
axiomatic that clientelism involves employment and that this destroys
state capacity.
It is political incentives that influence the form of redistribution that
answer the questions posed in the WDR 2004 (p. 78) such as “why
are large public expenditures systematically misallocated- for exam-
ple to large infrastructure projects and the wage bills of bulky state
administrations, often at the expense of social services”. This arises
because, for example, a job can be targeted to a person in exchange
for support but social services cannot. Moreover, is it easier for a
politician to get credit for a job.
E. Ex Post
There are endemic problems of moral hazard in politics. Whatever
politicians may actually promise before an election (or perhaps a ‘con-
test for power’ in a non-democratic context) ex post they may have
incentives to renege. Given the nature of politics it is not possible to
enforce promises using third parties, such as judges, since it is the
government itself which is supposed to enforce contracts and which55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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controls the judiciary. Politicians may deviate from promises because
they themselves prefer other policies, or simply because they want to
steal for themselves money that they promised to spend on providing
public goods for citizens. The main issue here is what mechanisms of
accountability do citizens have to make sure that politicians carry
through with their promises and do not engage in venal activities.
Though this literature is much less developed than the ex ante litera-
ture there are some implications which are interesting for the World
Bank. Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986) and Persson, Tabellini and Roland
(1997) examined the conditions under which voters could use punish-
ment strategies to discipline politicians who renege on commitments
or engage in corruption. To be effective in disciplining politicians citi-
zens have to coordinate their voting strategies, so that again the abil-
ity of groups to solve the collective action problem is crucial for
accountability. Groups who cannot do this will not be able to effec-
tively sanction politicians.
Who controls the agendas of political parties is also likely to be im-
portant. Sanctions are only going to be effective in situations where
there are real alternatives for voters. If one considers a case like Co-
lombia then there are few options for voters who wish to discipline
one of the main parties. This clearly happens: President Samper was
widely believed to have taken bribes from drug mafias to help his
election campaign and as a result the Liberal party was punished in
the next election. Yet the only alternative is to punish by replacing the
Liberals with the Conservatives who are possibly equally corrupt. Note
also that if the poor controlled the agenda of a political party directly
there would be no commitment problem here (barring massive agency
problems) because the party itself would wish ex post to honor any
promises it made to the poor.
Many of the mechanisms I isolated in the ex ante section also apply in
this context. If people are poorly informed they may not understand
that policies they had been promised have not been implemented prop-
erly, or at all, and again there will be a failure of accountability. Simi-
larly, un-ideological ‘swing voters’ will be effective at punishing
miscreant incumbents because such voters are relatively willing to
switch and support an alternative political party.16 16 16 16 16
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F. Neglect - Benign or Strategic?
So far I have considered situations where the poor do not benefit from
redistribution because ex ante they do not have the correct political
attributes to extract promises, or ex post because they are not able to
effectively impose accountability on politicians. In some sense the
neglect that the poor experience in these situations is relatively be-
nign. They lose out because others are more desirable to court politi-
cally. Nevertheless, there are other situations where groups are
discriminated against strategically because of the anticipation that
policy that favors them will influence the future balance of power.
This idea was first discussed by Robinson (1998) and developed by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2002) and Bourguignon and Verdier
(2000). I illustrate it with an example from Ghana.
The anti-colonial movement was organized in Ghana by Kwame
Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP). However, as soon
as the promise of independence had been secured from the British the
anti-colonial coalition in Ghana crumbled. Chazan and Pellow note
(1986, p. 30).
“by 1951, with the British agreement in principle to grant in-
dependence to the colony, this stage of decolonization gave
way to a period of domestic struggles for power on the eve of
independence. At this junction, the internal tensions that had
been somewhat in check erupted into an open clash over the
control of the colonial state”.
This left Nkrumah (who was from a minor Akan ethnic group - the
Nzima) with a very precarious political base. To compensate for this
Nkrumah engaged in a “divide and rule” strategy with respect to the
Ashanti (whose chiefs were one of his strongest opponents) by at-
tempting to set different factions of commoners against the chiefs.
Austin (1964, p. 250) notes that the chiefs and their National Libera-
tion Movement (NLM),
“met the nationalist appeal of the CPP with a rival nationalism
of its own, through an impassioned demand for recognition of
the traditional unity of the Ashanti nation”.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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This political strategy ensured Nkrumah’s power at independence in
1957. After the departure of the British, he moved to suppress the
opposition and altered the Constitution (in a fraudulent plebiscite) to
strengthen his powers. Pellow and Chazan (1986, p. 41) argue that
“The 1960 constitutional referendum...augmented the powers
of the executive..Nkrumah was elected president of the First
Republic, and thus, for all intents and purposes, by 1960 Ghana
had become a one-party state with Nkrumah as its leader. The
authoritarian tendencies apparent during decolonization were
officially entrenched in the centralized and personalized pat-
tern of government that emerged at this juncture”.
Despite the announced objectives of modernization, the need to stabi-
lize political power seems to be the key determinant of economic poli-
cies. Pellow and Chazan (1986, p.45) argue that by 1964 the CPP had
“reduced the role of the state to that of a dispenser of patron-
age. By advocating the construction of a ramified bureaucracy,
Nkrumah established a new social stratum directly dependent
on the state. By curtailing the freedom of movement of these
state functionaries through the diversion of administrative tasks
to political ends, the regime contributed directly to undermin-
ing their effective performance”.
The disastrous economic impact of the CPP’s policies have been well
analyzed by Bates (1981), some of whose results I discussed above.
In addition to the agricultural policies Nkrumah also embarked on an
ambitious industry policy. However, the contradictions of Nkrumah’s
heavily subsidized government led industrialization program imme-
diately became apparent, as Killick (1978, p. 37) notes,
“Even had there been the possibility [of creating an indigenous
entrepreneurial class] it is doubtful that Nkrumah would have
wanted to create such a class, for reasons of ideology and politi-
cal power. He was very explicit about this saying ‘we would be
hampering our advance to socialism if we were to encourage the
growth of Ghanian private capitalism in our midst’. There is
evidence that he also feared the threat that a wealthy class of
Ghanaian businessmen might pose to his own political power”.18 18 18 18 18
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Further evidence on this comes from E. Ayeh-Kumi one of Nkrumah’s
main economic advisers who noted after the coup that Nkrumah
(Killick, 1978, p. 60)
“informed me that if he permitted African business to grow, it
will grow to becoming a rival power to his and the party’s
prestige, and he would do everything to stop it, which he actu-
ally did”.
Nkurmah’s solution was to limit the size of businesses that Ghanaian
could own. This caused problems for his industrialization policy which
he got round by allowing foreign businessmen to enter Ghana. Though
this was inconsistent with his aggressively nationalistic and anti-im-
perialistic rhetoric these businessmen did not pose a domestic politi-
cal threat. Killick (p. 37) notes “Given Nkrumah’s desire to keep
Ghanaian private businesses small, his argument that ‘Capital invest-
ment must be sought from abroad since there is no bourgeois class
amongst us to carry on the necessary investment’ was disingenuous”.
He goes on to add that, (p. 40) Nkrumah “had no love of foreign capi-
talists but he preferred to encourage them rather than local entrepre-
neurs, whom he wished to restrict”.
In this example it was not simply that Ghanaian businessmen did not
have the correct positive political characteristics to induce the CPP to
offer them favorable policies. They actually had negative political
characteristics which made the CPP want to bias policy against them.
There are many examples of this sport of thing in the historical and
political science literatures (see Robinson, 1998 and Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2002 for other examples and Dalton, 1965, on Liberia).
Another particularly interesting related issue is whether or not the
decision to adopt clientelism is influenced by the desire to control
collective action. In many informal studies it is argued that clientelism
is a type of “divide and rule” political strategy and is attractive pre-
cisely because it destroys the ability of groups to engage in collective
action by selectively undermining their solidarity. For example,
Waterbury (1977, p. 340) notes55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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“In the poorer societies patronage helps obscure and disorient
class alignments and to perpetuate the power advantage of the
dominant groups by the conscious cultivation of vulnerability
and dependency”.
If these types of forces operate against the poor then things may be
even worse than had been imagined. There may be a bright side how-
ever. Under the CPP, Lebanese businessmen were allowed to function
because they were not politically threatening to the regime. Similarly,
it could well be the case that NGOs and the World Bank can function
in providing services in a non-politically threatening way which might
not be open to domestic organizations or groups.
II. Determinants of Political Strategies
I discussed above some of the empirical findings about why the level
of public expenditure varies across countries. In this section I concen-
trate on the more relevant issues of what we know about what deter-
mines the extent of clientelism in a society, or the factors that lead
politics to be clientelistic rather than programmatic? What factors might
influence the intensity of clientelism? Why do some societies suffer
more from political pathologies than others? What do we know about
the conditions under which some political characteristics dominate
others? What determines the form of income redistribution or govern-
ment policies?
Evidence on any of these questions is highly tentative. There are quite
a few ideas in both the formal and informal literature, but as yet few
conclusive tests. For example, though the theoretical models which
follow Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) emphasize the idea that swing
voters are important, there is not much evidence that swing voters are
important in determining actual redistributive outcomes. Recent work
by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) using a panel of U.S. states finds
no evidence that swing voters are important and rather government
spending is concentrated on the districts that tend to support the in-
cumbent party. Their empirical work is interesting because it tends to
support a view of the world related to the ‘citizen-candidate’ model of
Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). In this,20 20 20 20 20
Politician-Proof Policy?
James A. Robinson
politicians have preferences over the policies they adopt and are un-
able to commit to any other type of policy. Anticipating this, voters
vote for politicians whose preferences are relatively like their own.
This echoes a theme which I have already introduced, the importance
of political party objectives, and suggests that the poor will only ben-
efit from policies when they can organize their own political party
and poor people themselves manage to run for office (such as the
Worker’s Party in Brazil).
What about empirical evidence on the composition of expenditure?
Persson and Tabellini (2003) examine the cross-country determinants
of welfare spending as a % of GDP. Welfare spending includes things
like spending on pensions and unemployment insurance. They find
that only the age structure of the population has any robust explana-
tory power, though there is some evidence that welfare spending is
higher in democracies.
I now discuss some of the factors which models suggest are important
and what evidence can be brought to bear to assess their importance.
A. Modernization
Consider first the conditions under which a society tends to have cli-
entelistic politics. The basic idea in political science is that clientelism
characterizes ‘unmodernized’ polities (e.g. Lemarchand and Legg,
1972). Indeed, clientelism is seen as an extension of pre-modern poli-
tics. In some models the attractiveness of clientelism may depend on
the level of per-capita income. For example, in Robinson and Verdier
(2002) the higher is per-capita income, other things equal, the greater
the opportunity cost of inefficient clientelistic redistribution and the
less attractive it is. In their model, income growth can lead to the
abandonment of clientelism, and this certainly formalizes some of the
ideas in the political science literature.
A central aspect of modernization, as conceptualized by Lipset (1959)
was the emergence of a strong middle class. A large group of theories
in political science connect the middle class to institutional change
(e.g. Moore, 1966, on democracy) and the rise of the middle class has
also been seen as a driving force behind the Progressive Era in the US55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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which significantly reduced corruption and clientelism (Glaeser and
Goldin, 2004). Thus the development of a strong middle class ought
to promote better policy outcomes.
What cross-country evidence there is, is roughly consistent with this.
Apart from the evidence cited above on the cross-country determi-
nants of transfer income, there is very little work on how to measure
or account for clientelism. I know of no good work trying to explain
the composition of government expenditures across countries in or-
der to test some of the ideas I have discussed. One idea is to look at
corruption. Empirical studies find that the level of per-capita income
has a robust negative effect, other things equal, on corruption (e.g.
Treisman, 2000, Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003, Persson and
Tabellini, 2003). Nevertheless, examples such as the persistence of
endemic clientelism in Italy at least into the 1990’s and the wide-
spread clientelism currently argued to exist in middle income countries
such as Argentina and Colombia does not suggest that simply waiting
for growth to end clientelism is a very attractive option.
B. History
A potent source of institutional variation between countries is differ-
ent historical experiences. In the context of currently developing coun-
tries colonialism had radically different impacts creating very different
societies in different places (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, 2001). This is obviously important in explain-
ing why the United States is more democratic and has more pro-poor
politics than Bolivia. These historical legacies certainly have important
implications today. For example, Bratton and van de Walle (1997) ar-
gue that the semi-settler colonies such as South Africa and Zimbabwe
have more chance of ultimately consolidating democracy than other
African nations because of their different institutional endowments.
C. Factor Endowments
One set of factors, heavily emphasized in the informal political sci-
ence literature, concern natural resource endowments. Countries with
economies centered on the extraction of natural resources such as oil
or precious minerals like gold or diamonds are seen to be particularly22 22 22 22 22
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prone to clientelism. This is because such endowments give the gov-
ernment a solid resource base which they can use for patronage. Even
if the rest of the economy collapses due to state incapacity or failure
to provide necessary public goods the income from the resources keeps
flowing. In addition, since natural resource rents can so easily be taxed
in poor countries with inadequate fiscal systems, the greater the share
of such resources in income, the greater the benefits from holding
power. Since clientelism is a strategy aimed at staying in power, the
greater the benefits of being in power the more endemic will be clien-
telism (see Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2002).
Nations that depend on the extraction of natural resource ‘enclaves’
are thus thought to be highly prone to clientelistic strategies. To quote
Leonard and Strauss (2003, p. 13).
“Enclave economies, we argue, are a foundation for personal
rule. In such regimes, rather than developing infrastructure or
institutional capacities for broad-based markets, states collect
and distribute ‘rents’ (taxes and bribes) as patronage. An en-
clave economic base allows personal rule to sustain itself over
the long run both because enclaves themselves are susceptible
to state predation and because enclaves do not depend on wide-
spread productivity for their sustenance. Thus the state’s pri-
mary function can be private patronage distribution because
wealth generation does not depend on development”.
The relevant empirical evidence on this, due to Treisman (2000), looks
at the connection between natural resource exports and corruption.
His findings suggest some evidence that countries where natural re-
sources are a high fraction of income tend to be more corrupt, other
things equal. Ades and di Tella (1999) present similar evidence. Persson
and Tabellini (2003) also show that the size of government is larger in
such economies.
D. Geo-Political Environment
Possibly the most important source of comparative statics for the World
Bank is the relationships between the international geo-political envi-
ronment and domestic political strategies. Unfortunately, the resound-55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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ing conclusion is that the international system has created highly per-
verse incentives for politicians in developing countries. The most re-
cent sweeping version of this thesis is in the literature on state formation
in Africa due to Herbst (2000) and Bates (2001) (though see Robinson,
2002, for some caveats about the empirical applicability of this thesis).
Herbst and Bates attempt to explain why African states have so little
‘capacity’ and why the continent is plagued by ‘state failure’. A state
is meant to provide certain public goods in society, such as law and
order, defense, contract enforcement, and infrastructure. Yet in Africa
most states provide very few of these. They are unable to exercise
control over much of their territory, they do not provide order or pub-
lic goods. What then is different about African states that leads them
to diverge so radically from our ideal?
The Herbst-Bates thesis builds on a rich tradition of work on the ori-
gins of European Nation States initiated by Max Weber. This litera-
ture attempted to explain the origins of modern institutions such as
nation states with well-defined territories. Nation states are character-
ized not just by borders and citizens with national identities, but also
by bureaucracies, fiscal systems, and representative institutions such
as parliaments. Especially influential has been the work of Tilly (1990).
The central idea of this literature is that the high population density of
Europe made land relatively scare and valuable to control, particu-
larly from the late middle-ages onwards. This and technological change
in the methods of warfare (e.g. more sophisticated battle tactics and
firearms) drew states into continual conflict. But warfare is costly and
early modern states required resources to attack and defend. Kings
were therefore in a continual battle with Lords and Commoners over
taxes. To get money for wars, Kings had to build bureaucracies, they
had to gather information and map their territory and people. They
also had to make concessions - such as creating regular parliaments
where citizens could have a voice. An alternative to concessions was to
crush domestic opponents who resisted the demands of Kings. All these
things were necessary to survive. If a state did not become “stronger”
then typically it became extinct, as was the case with Poland.
This process created the modern system of nation states with their
familiar institutional infrastructures that consolidated in Europe in the24 24 24 24 24
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nineteenth century. The Herbst-Bates thesis is that this process has
not taken place in Africa. It did not take place historically in the pre-
colonial era, it did not take place during the colonial epoch, and it is
not taking place since or now. Why?
Africa is different because the structural conditions that led to the
path of state formation and institution building in Europe were absent
in Africa. Firstly, unlike in Europe, land was and is not scarce in Af-
rica. Rather labor was scarce. Thus in the pre-colonial period states
did not fight over land, but rather people. This explains why property
rights in people (slavery) are well defined, but those in land were not
(to this day most land in Africa is held communally). This meant that
pre-colonial states had vague borders and were often very “weak”.
Without the constant necessity of defending a well defined territory
states did not need to invest in bureaucracies, censuses of their popu-
lation, tax collectors, permanent militaries. Herbst also argues that
this explains the absence of pre-colonial mapping in Africa.
This absence of external threats coupled with low population densi-
ties persisted. During the colonial period there was little fighting over
borders between the colonial powers. The conference of Berlin in 1885
largely determined which European power would have which bit of
Africa. This meant that like the pre-colonial polities, European colo-
nial powers had little incentive to develop state institutions. Instead
they focused on commercial exploitation and outright plunder of the
mineral and natural wealth. The exceptions to this are the settler-colo-
nies of South Africa, Rhodesia, and to a lesser extent Kenya. Follow-
ing independence, the situation could have changed but it did not
because the International state system and United Nations decided to
enforce the colonial boundaries that had largely determined the form
that the new nations took. This trend was reinforced by Cold-War
politics. Thus African states were still able to survive without having
to engage in the type of institution building that occurred historically
in Europe. When the borders were threatened, such as when Libya
invaded Chad, they could reply on the United Nations or European
powers sending troops to the rescue.
Herbst and Bates argue that the lack of development of African state
institutions helps explain many aspects of modern Africa. Since states55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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never had to fight to survive they never had to build effective fiscal
institutions. Therefore they have no tax bases and instead have to en-
gage in highly distortionary methods of raising taxes (such as taxing
trade) or redistributing income (for example via employment in
parastatals). Since states never had to fight to survive, rulers never
had to consolidate their rule and crush domestic opposition. Hence
the incidence of warlordism so evident in countries such as Angola,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Since states never had to fight to survive,
they never had to make political concessions to their citizens. Hence
the lack of functioning domestic political institutions such as parlia-
ments and the completely unconsolidated nature of democracy in Af-
rica. Moreover, the lack of these institutions can help explain the extent
of venality and state corruption in Africa since these institutions pro-
vide key checks on abuses like this. Finally, this set of institutions has
been further encouraged in the last fifty years by foreign aid and de-
velopment assistance. These transfers give states valuable resources
that allows them to stay in power without having to develop indig-
enous state institutions to raise taxes. Thus the incapacity of African
states has been reinforced not just by Cold-War politics but also by
less cynical attempts to help.
The connection between the Herbst-Bates thesis and the concerns of
the World Bank is that it provides a structural explanation for why
there are weak states in Africa and weak states are prone to clien-
telism. Indeed, both authors subscribe to the ‘personal rule paradigm’
the idea being that weak state institutions make personal rule and at-
tractive, maybe necessary political strategy. The key idea here is that
both authors argue that it is the international system, of which the
World Bank is a key player, that has helped to sustain weak clientelis-
tic states.
Another perspective on the same issue come from the work of van de
Walle (2001). He examines the failure of African countries to perform
well economically since independence and why policy reform since
1979 has been so unsuccessful in changing anything. His analysis
suggests that good economic policies and performance are inconsist-
ent with clientelism (or neo-patrimonialism in his terms) and that policy
reform does not take place because it would undermine the ability of
rulers to use patronage to maintain their power. Depressingly, he con-26 26 26 26 26
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cludes that the role of International Financial Institutions such as the
World Bank has been to entrench such practices since they provide
the resources that allows clientelism to persist as a viable political
strategy even in the midst of economic collapse.
Even the World Bank itself recognized this potential. For example,
Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren (2001, p. 6) in their summing up of
ten African case studies make one of their conclusions,
“Large amounts of aid to countries with bad policy sustained
those poor policies. The funding allowed the delay of reform.
Attaching conditions to the aid in these cases has not success-
fully led to policy change, nor has it delayed the disbursement
of funds”.
There is even some tentative cross-national empirical work on this
topic by Knack (2000).
E. Other Socio-Economic Variables
The academic literature also contains other comparative static results
which may help to understand when clientelism or political pathologies
occur in equilibrium.
One interesting factor here is globalization. Many empirical studies
have found that greater trade openness or globalization reduces cor-
ruption (e.g. Treisman, 2000). This finding is also consistent with more
detailed country work such as that of Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and
Weingast (2000) on the collapse of PRI hegemony in Mexico, and
that by Golden (2001) on the collapse of Christian Democratic he-
gemony in Italy. In both cases political parties which had sustained
their power for decades using highly clientelistic strategies, collapsed
in the face of changed international environments. The most likely
explanation of this seems to be that globalization changes the socio-
economic structure and undermines the political base of clientelism.
For example in Mexico, globalization led to a large expansion of
maquiladores in the northern states. These firms had non-unionized
workforces whose political activities were not controlled by the un-55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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ions associated with the PRI. This provided a political base for other
parties such as the PRD.
What about inequality? The notion that relative poverty may be an at-
tractive political characteristic (first discussed by Dixit and Londregan,
1996) seems overly optimistic. When voters have strictly diminishing
marginal utility of income, poor people have higher marginal utility.
This means that they are willing to change their voting behavior for
smaller amounts of money than richer people and hence are cheaper for
politicians to ‘buy’. The problem with this story can be illustrated with
the following idea from Robinson and Verdier (2002). Imagine that in-
cumbents governments have to choose some action before an election,
such as how much public good to provide and this public good increases
individual incomes. When poor individuals are cheaper to buy, this gives
politicians an incentive to under-provide public goods in order to keep
them poor and make them cheaper to buy.
F. Political Regimes and Institutions
An obvious source of variation in equilibrium political strategies stems
from differences in political institutions. Might some types of politi-
cal institutions lead to clientelistic redistribution? This idea has been
answered positively by recent work.
One cut at this might be to distinguish between regime types. Are
democracies more or less clientelistic than dictatorships? Unfortu-
nately, as I noted above, most of the formal and empirical literature
has focused on democracies so it is hard to say on the basis of this
research how much clientelism one would expect in a dictatorship.
Nevertheless, as I argued there, even dictators have to generate sup-
port, even if they lean less on soliciting votes in elections. To get
support they face similar trade-offs between clientelistic and program-
matic strategies. A natural conjecture is that the base of support of a
dictatorship (at least a non-totalitarian one) is narrower than one for a
democratic politician. One might expect this to be true because of
there is a trade-off between repression and policy. Consider the prob-
ability of a dictator remaining in power as a function of repression
and amount of support, call this P(R,S). Fixing an iso-probability func-
tion (level set), P(R,S)=P it is natural to imagine that as R increases S
decreases. Hence, since dictators find it easier to use force to stay in28 28 28 28 28
Politician-Proof Policy?
James A. Robinson
power than democrats, we expect the dictatorial optimum to involve
more R and a smaller base of support than in a democracy.
A natural idea is that clientelism is more attractive as a strategy the
narrower is the support base a politician aims for. For instance Cox
(1987) argued that democratization in Britain in the 19th century led
to a switch from clientelism to programmatic appeals because clien-
telism is simply infeasible in large electorates (see Lizzeri and Persico,
2004, for an interesting formal approach to this idea). In this case we
might expect, other things equal, less clientelism in democracy since
there is a shift away from repressing to attracting support. There is not
much relevant evidence on this question. Treisman (2000) for exam-
ple finds no evidence that, other things equal, democracies tend to be
more corrupt than non-democracies, although he does find that a suf-
ficiently long history of democracy reduces corruption. On the other
hand, and relevant for this study, Dollar and Svensson (2000) find
that democracies implement structural adjustment programs more and
Svensson (1999) finds that international aid has a positive effect on
growth only in countries that are relatively democratic. If the pres-
ence of successfully implemented reforms and good effects of aid on
economic performance are indicative of a lack of clientelism, then
this is interesting evidence about the implications of democracy.
Also relevant for the World Bank is the literature on the connection
between democracy and educational expenditures. Though examples
such as India are often used to suggest that democracy does not help
to promote education there is both cross-country (Baum and Lake,
2003) and historical work suggesting that, others things equal, de-
mocracy does promote education. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b)
first pointed out that historically within Western Europe educational
expansion followed democratization and this point has been firmly
supported by Lindert (2001, 2004). Engerman, Mariscal and Sokoloff
(2000) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2001) show that a similar rela-
tionship holds within the Americas. Though this is only correlation,
not causation, case studies suggest that the relationship is indeed causal
with greater democracy leading to public demands for education to
actually become policy. There is also quite a bit of other evidence
suggesting that democracy is more pro-poor than the alternatives (e.g.
Rodrik, 1999, Foster and Rosenzweig, 2002).55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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Most of the empirical work on this topic restricts attention to institu-
tional variation within democracies. This work looks at how things
like the electoral system and whether or not a democracy is presiden-
tial or parliamentary influences clientelism. In an important paper,
Carey and Shugart (1995) provided an analysis of the types of fea-
tures of electoral systems which lent themselves to clientelism (or
what they called ‘personalism’). They argue that clientelism tends to
arise when political parties are weak, exert little influence over candi-
date selection and where votes are cast for individuals, rather than
parties. Also important is whether or not votes pool across lists and
whether lists are open or closed. Also important is the size of electoral
districts and the number of votes a politician needs to win. This litera-
ture qualifies the claims of Cox (1987) about Britain. It stresses that the
infeasibility of clientelism in Britain after the 1870’s may have been
due to the form of electoral institutions. In other countries, such as Italy
or Colombia, clientelism seems to be consistent with large electorates.
The more recent empirical work of Persson and Tabellini (2003),
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) has examined the effect
of institutional variation on the level of spending, which is less inter-
esting for our present purposes. However, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi
(2003) do examine the implications of institutional variation for cor-
ruption. They find that larger voting districts –and thus lower barriers
to entry– are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of
candidates elected from party lists –and thus less individual
accountability– are associated with more corruption. Individual ac-
countability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in
plurality -rule elections, even though open party lists also seem to
have some effect. Because different aspects roughly offset each other, a
switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only
has a small negative effect on corruption. These authors derive a number
of testable implications from political economy models where aspects
of the incentives created by electoral institutions are formalized.
Unfortunately, it is quite hard to draw strong conclusions from this
literature as it stands. Firstly, many of the empirical implications seem
quite unrobust to small changes in the model. Secondly, this work
undoubtedly places too much emphasis on formal political institu-
tions. As is well known, actual political outcomes represent an inter-30 30 30 30 30
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action between formal and informal institutions and the whole point
of the ‘personal rule paradigm’ is that the political reality in Africa is
very uninstitutionalized in a formal sense. Personalism is the antith-
esis of a world governed by formal institutions. Thus the applicability
of any of these results in developing countries must be in severe doubt.
 Finally, it is not clear what causes what. For example, following Carey
and Shugart (1995), to describe situations where political parties are
weak, exert little influence over candidate selection and where votes
are cast for individuals, rather than parties, as an institutional envi-
ronment which leads to clientelism seems to confuse a description of
a phenomena with its explanation.
Moreover, the notion that electoral institutions have large independ-
ent effects on the level and composition of government expenditure
takes as axiomatic the exogeneity of the electoral institutions, some-
thing which is clearly problematic. Consider the contribution of Milesi-
Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002). They argue that Scandinavian
countries redistribute more because they have proportional represen-
tation (PR) electoral systems. Where did these systems come from?
Rokkan (1970) showed that in the nineteenth century nearly all Euro-
pean countries had majoritarian electoral institutions. Some switched
to PR as mass democracy arrived in the early twentieth century. Why
did some (Sweden) but not others (Britain) do so? Rokkan argued
that this depended on how strong the socialist party was. When the
socialist party was strong (Sweden) incumbent conservative parties
feared being eliminated in majoritarian competition and thus switched
to PR to preserve some portion of their power. When socialist parties
were less powerful (Britain) conservatives felt able to compete under
the old institutions and there was no change. Imagine then that the
socialist parties favored more redistribution. In this case what Rokkan
argued was that the move to PR in Scandinavia was motivated by a
desire to reduce redistribution. Why do Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and
Rostagno (2002) find that PR increases redistribution? This is because
there is an omitted variable, the strength of socialism which presum-
ably rests on other uncontrolled for socio-economic variables. Inter-
estingly then, thinking through some of the implications of
endogenizing institutions, suggests that the actual impact of PR may
be the opposite of the existing conventional wisdom.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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Further reason to be sceptical about the causal claims made by schol-
ars about electoral institutions comes from the work of Mazzuca and
Robinson (2002) on Latin America. They show that in the case of
Colombia and Uruguay, the phenomena which the electoral institu-
tions are supposed to have caused (in Carey and Shugart, 1995) actu-
ally preceded the introduction of the electoral institutions. In Colombia,
parties were weak and politics clientelistic throughout the nineteenth
century and endemically so in the period prior to 1929 when PR was
introduced. They study why electoral institutions took the form that
they did in this period and show that they were designed basically as
a barrier to entry. The traditional Liberal and Conservative parties
were very fragmented and worried about factions breaking away to
form new parties. This became a huge problem in the 1920’s because of
rapid modernization and socio-economic change. In response, the par-
ties introduced electoral rules which guaranteed to factions that they
would be represented in congress and the senate and the only way this
could be credibly assured was by building the weakness of the central
party into the institutions. Thus the institutions did not cause weak par-
ties and personalism. If anything it was the other way round.
Though I am sceptical therefore about the notion that clientelism is
caused by the intricate features of political institutions such as elec-
toral rules, one clear institution that does seem to be connected to
clientelism in the form of the ballot. Though clientelism and political
exchange may rely on trust, in reality it seems to work much better
when voting can be observed or inferred. For example, Baland and
Robinson (2003) show that before the introduction of the Australian
ballot in Chile in 1958, there was a strong relationship between the
presence of inquilinos, dependent laborers on agricultural estates, and
the vote share of right-wing parties. After 1958 this relationship com-
pletely vanished. Their evidence strongly suggests that before 1958 the
absence of an effective secret ballot (political parties themselves issued
the ballots and if a voter wished to vote for, say, the Radical party they
had to request a radical ballot, which made it easy to tell how they were
voting) allowed landowners to control the way their workers voted.
Why is this important for the World Bank? When relationships exist
which allow votes to be controlled, it is the preferences of those who
do the controlling that are relevant for political parties. In trying to32 32 32 32 32
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design policy platforms to win power, parties will aim to please those
with the votes. Scott (1972) makes exactly this argument in his dis-
cussion of electoral corruption. He refers to individuals whose votes
are controlled by others as ‘locked-in electorates’ were (p. 99) “the
voter was connected to the larger political system through his agent-
patron whose control over his political will was a function of his con-
trol over his means of subsistence”. In such a system (1972, p. 98),
“There was no sense in parties or candidates appealing directly to
‘locked-in electorates’. By definition, these were voters who could be
mustered most easily by coming to terms with their landlord, their em-
ployer, or their master who could deliver their votes in the election”.
This immediately implies that public goods will be undersupplied
because the benefit that these have on the utilities of those whose
votes are controlled is discounted. Instead, parties will want to target
their policies to those controlling votes (Baland and Robinson, 2003).
 In addition, vote buying, even in the absence of vote controlling, can
lead to inefficiency in the provision of public goods when citizens
have unequal political power. In this case, rational politicians attempt
to target their policies at the most powerful citizens and since public
goods cannot be targeted, they are undersupplied so as to make more
resources available for buying the votes of these pivotal individuals
(this type of inefficiency is closely related to that discussed by Persson
and Tabellini, 1999, and Lizzeri and Persico, 2000a).
Though one might think this is of historical interest only it is not.
Colombia only moved to a similar voting procedure in the 1990’s and
Brazil switched to electronic voting in 1993 in an attempt to control
vote buying and electoral corruption. No other Latin American coun-
try currently uses electronic voting.
Another type of political institutions which has been linked to politi-
cal corruption is federalism. Contrary to his working hypothesis
Treisman (2000) found that federalism increased corruption.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
DESARROLLO Y SOCIEDAD
33 33 33 33 33
G. Political Competition
The extent to which any of these mechanisms come into play plausi-
bly depends on the amount of political competition. For example, even
if a group cannot solve the collective action problem this may not
matter if they are numerous enough that politicians need their sup-
port. An interesting example of this comes from the work of Bates
(1997). In his work on Ghana, Bates (1981) showed that because co-
coa farmers were smallholders they had been unable to solve the col-
lective action problem. Cocoa farmers were also politically disadvan-
tage because they were primarily Ashanti, and the early post
-independence governments in Ghana, particularly under Nkrumah, were
based on a non-Ashanti coalition of ethnic groups as I noted above. As
a result, cocoa farmers were heavily penalized. Compare this to Colombia
where the majority of coffee growers are also smallholders. Bates
(1997) showed that coffee growers had been favored by policy because
of the intense political competition between the Liberal and
Conservative parties. Thus Bates provided a very interesting example
of a situation where political entrepreneurs had solved the collective
action problem for producers because they had seen it was in their
direct electoral interests.
The question of the impact of political competition on pro-poor policy
is particularly interesting because despite the Chicago-style intuition
that political competition, just like market competition, must be good,
many of the recent theoretical models suggest that in fact it is bad.
Highly relevant for this paper, this is true in Persico and Lizzeri’s
model (2002b). These authors allow the number of political parties to
vary exogenously in a model where parties can compete by offering
broad public goods which benefit all citizens or transfers that can be
individually targeted. They show that when there are more parties, a
situation they call more competitive, the smaller the expected vote
share of any particular political party. The smaller is this vote share
the less attractive is the provision of the public good (since this ben-
efits all agents even those not expect to support you) and the less
efficient in expectation in the equilibrium.
One might complain about the definition of political competition here.
Moreover, it seems somewhat unrealistic to imagine that political com-34 34 34 34 34
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petition is always and everywhere bad. Acemoglu and Robinson (2002)
try to reconcile these apparently irreconcilable positions. They use a
more standard definition of political competition which is incumbency
advantage. In the model there is a socially efficient policy which the
incumbent can take but which erodes his advantage. They think of
this as a reduced form for a number of ideas in the literature. They
then show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the ex-
tent of incumbency (political competition) and efficiency. On the one
hand when incumbency is very high (political competition very low)
the incumbent is very entrenched and there is little chance of losing
power. In this case he is relatively indifferent to losing some of this
advantage and implements the efficient policy. On the other hand,
when incumbency advantage is very low (political competition is very
high) the incumbent has little to lose and again adopts the efficient
policy. It is therefore somewhere in-between, where there is incum-
bency advantage but the incumbent fears losing it, that we expect
inefficient policies to be chosen.
There is as yet very little hard empirical evidence about the impact of
political competition. Besley and Preston (2003) find that increased
political competition within Britain leads to more political account-
ability. In their analysis and interpretation of the evidence, greater
competition means that politicians have to work harder to improve
their reputations and this is socially efficient.
H. Political Identity
One of the factors listed in section 2.1.2 was the ability of the poor to
form a political party or perhaps equivalently to capture the agenda of
an existing party. The case study literature from political science, fol-
lowing the seminal work of Shefter (1977), suggests the overwhelm-
ing importance of this factor. Shefter (see also his 1994 paper) made a
distinction between political parties that were ‘externally mobilized’
and those that were ‘internally mobilized’. Parties that were internally
mobilized formed within the current political system and were able to
have access to government employment, contracts and all the other
usual levers of patronage. Parties that were externally mobilized how-
ever did not have these advantages. They could not compete for power
by offering clientelism and instead had to adopt programmatic, non-55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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clientelistic methods of competing. Shefter initially used this model
to explain the collapse of clientelism in Britain, Germany and Italy.
Shefter’s model certainly has theoretical problems, for example if
patronage is so useful why can’t externally organized parties use it
when they attain power? Nevertheless, it appears to have very wide-
spread political applicability. Indeed, most of the case studies of the
collapse of clientelism fit very well into his simple dichotomy. One
example of this include Chubb’s (1982) superb study of the Christian
Democratic machine in Palermo and Naples. Chubb describes in great
detail how the control of patronage, particularly public sector em-
ployment, allowed the Christian Democratic party to be continually
re-elected despite completely failing to deliver socially beneficial
policies. In 1975 the Christian Democrats lost control of Naples to the
Communists and clientelism ended because the Communists were
committed to a non-clientelistic public sector employment policy.
Chubb also explains why the Communists won in Naples but not in
Palermo. This was because the central government in Rome followed
a regional development policy which entailed building large indus-
trial plants in Naples, but not Palermo. The employment practices of
these plants were constrained by the fact that the workers were organ-
ized by labor unions who were closely connected to the Communists
and who opposed the clientelistic practices of the Christian Demo-
crats. This provided an electoral base for the Communists and broke
the electoral dominance previously provided by the control of public
sector appointments.
This analysis is consistent with that of Tarrow (1967, p. 44) who sug-
gests that,
“faced by the well organized interest groups of Milan, Turin
and Genoa, southern clienteles are unable to bargain effectively
since they can only trade in personal favors. The lack of politi-
cal integration between the regions... is a structural factor; the
clientelistic system is actually congruent with the south’s frag-
mented social structure and resists or modifies the forms and
techniques of a modern party system”.36 36 36 36 36
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Another important example just as well documented is the fall of cli-
entelism in Porto Allegre in Brazil (Abers, 2000). Other examples of
the collapse of clientelism fit into Shefter’s scheme. An interesting
example comes from the evidence on the effects of political and fiscal
decentralization in Colombia. Angell, Lowden and Thorp (2001) stud-
ied the impact of political decentralization in four Colombian cities,
Pasto, Manizales, Ibagué and Valledupar. An important force break-
ing clientelism in Pasto was the election of Antonio Navarro Wolf in
1994, one of the leaders of the M-19 party. M-19 was originally a
guerilla movement which laid down it’s arms in the 1980’s and be-
came a political party, another example of an externally mobilized
party. A final example from Indian is the effects of the rise of the
Communist party in West Bengal in the 1970’s (see Banerjee, Gertler
and Ghatak, 2000, for some interesting implications of this).
In all these cases it was the rise of an externally mobilized party which
was committed to non-clientelistic strategies which marked a dramatic
change in the political equilibrium. This led to much more pro-poor
policy and a greater provision of public goods. Note however that
what is important about this evidence is that a clientelism of the rich
was not simply replaced by a clientelism of the poor, there was a quali-
tative change in the nature of politics and a switch away from clien-
telism to a socially much more efficient form of political competition.
III.When Things go Right
The above sections suggest that there are many features of a society’s
institutions and endowments that influence the nature of the political
equilibrium. It appears that all of these may vary independently. Other
evidence however suggests that many of these things may be corre-
lated so that often good things go together as do bad. This would be
consistent with the empirical findings of Levine and Renelt (1992)
who show that the estimated effects of policy on growth tend to be
highly non-robust probably due to multicollinearity. The obvious in-
terpretation of this is that countries with high budget deficits and
parastatals with negative value added do not at the same time do a
good job providing public goods like health services or education.
When one things is screwed up, everything tends to be screwed up.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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This is also consistent with the evidence of Acemoglu, Johnson,
Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) who shows that the negative growth
effects of many policy variables disappears. Their evidence suggests
a more parsimonious account of poor development.
To illustrate how things may go right together let me consider the
case of Botswana (I follow Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2003).
As is well known, Botswana a small, tropical, landlocked country in
sub-Saharan Africa has had the fastest average rate of economic growth
in the world in the last 35 years. So what explains Botswana’s suc-
cess? One can list several factors,
1. Botswana is very rich in diamonds.
2. It appears to have had a relatively unique set of indigenous socio-
political institutions.
3. Colonization had a very limited impact on these indigenous insti-
tutions.
4. The post-independence political elite inherited the legitimacy of
these institutions.
5. It was also rurally based and heavily invested in the main non-
mining productive sector (cattle ranching).
The argument of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003) is that it is
not any of these key factors by itself, but a combination of them –i.e.,
the interaction between them– that has been important in Botswana.
They argued that Botswana was able to adopt good policies and
institutions because they were in the interests of the political elites,
which included the cattle owners and powerful tribal actors. But it
wasn’t simply that cattle owners were politically powerful. Instead, they
inherited a set of institutional prerequisites that ensured that they would
keep their political power by pursuing good policies and placed
restrictions on infighting among themselves over political rents.
Crucial in this was the fact that, contrary to many other nations an
Africa, South America or the Caribbean, Botswana avoided the ad-
verse effects of colonial rule. This is particularly important in the
Botswana case because, as noted above, its pre-colonial sociopoliti-38 38 38 38 38
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cal institutions were relatively good. These institutions lowered the
stakes from politics and the vested interests in bad policies, and in-
creased the legitimacy and breadth of the coalition that sustained the
post-independence political elite. These institutional features also
helped to make good economics also good politics in Botswana, while
restricting the range of distortionary economic policies that the lead-
ers could pursue.
These structural factors created a political equilibrium in which the dia-
mond wealth that came on stream in the 1970’s could be efficiently
exploited. The diamond reserves, in turn, created enough rents that the
critical actors were relatively satisfied with the status quo, and did not
want to fight to increase their share at the expense of destabilizing the
whole system. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003) conjectured
that, although it was not simply the diamonds that made Botswana grow,
the diamonds played a very important role, not only by providing a
resource base that could be exploited effectively with the correct set of
institutions, but also by creating sufficient rents in the system, so as to
increase the opportunity cost of further-rent seeking by the key actors.
Although this explanation is in terms of structural features, it also
appears that Botswana benefited from outstanding political leader-
ship that made several critical decisions that clearly influenced the
development path. These leaders operated in a relatively helpful envi-
ronment, but they probably also made a big difference. Seretse Khama’s
handling of the independence negotiations and constitutional conven-
tion, minerals policy, and generally political issues ensured that po-
litical stakes remained low, contributing to political stability and an
environment with secure property rights. For example, it appears plau-
sible that had Seretse Khama not transferred the property rights over
sub-soil diamonds away from his own tribe, the Bangwato, to the gov-
ernment, there could have been much greater conflict among tribes
over the control of the wealth from diamonds. Or had he not reduced
the real political powers of tribal chiefs shortly after independence,
tribal cleavages may have been more important.
Interestingly Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s (2003) account de-
emphasizes the fact that Botswana is homogeneous from an ethno-
linguistic point of view. As we show below, to the extent that this is55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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true, it appears to be more of an outcome of Botswana’s political in-
stitutions than an independent cause. Moreover, it is clear that politi-
cal elites have studiously avoided exacerbating any underlying ethnic
tensions in Botswana. Both Somalia and Lesotho are undoubtedly more
homogeneous than Botswana and neither has succeeded economically
like Botswana. Moreover, Lesotho has a linguistic, cultural and insti-
tutional inheritance that is identical to Botswana, ruling out simple
cultural explanations of the exceptionality of Botswana.
One can therefore see Botswana’s exceptionality as a hopeful exam-
ple of what can be done, even with relatively unfavorable initial con-
ditions— though perhaps the juxtaposition of a number of favorable
characteristics was also necessary in enabling relatively good leader-
ship. Despite many apparent disadvantages, a good political equilib-
rium emerged in Botswana and from this many good things flowed -
political stability, astonishingly prudent macroeconomic policy, hard
budget constraints everywhere in the public sector, a socially rational
minerals policy. Botswana has also been able to respond to droughts
and threats of famine with very effective famine relief policies so that
actual famines have never arisen. Finally, in the 1970’s when the po-
litical hegemony of Khama’s Botswana Democratic Party first began
to be challenged it responded to the rise in political competition by
expanding education, not by engaging in clientelism.
Other success stories, such as Mauritius also seem to have this prop-
erty that when one thing goes right, everything does. In Mauritius one
sees the same types of things as in Botswana. For example, in the
1970’s when the Labour Party under Seewoosagur Ramgoolam started
to be challenged in elections by the Movement Militant Mauricien
they introduced free universal secondary education.
IV. What can the World Bank Do?
Though there are many ideas and some interesting case studies which
certainly reveal a lot about why pro-poor policies are not adopted, the
lessons for the World Bank are not obvious. First of all there is a lot of
uncertainty about which of the theoretical mechanisms are actually
important in practice and no doubt this varies a lot from country to
country. Empirical work of the most rudimentary kind (cross-national40 40 40 40 40
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regressions) has only just begun on this issue. Moreover, there is noth-
ing that the World Bank can do about many of the determinants of
equilibrium political strategies even if it wanted to. For instance, it is
hard to change the colonial inheritance of a country.
What then can the World Bank do? One clear message, I believe, is
that the activities of the World Bank are intrinsically political. The
World Bank provides resources which may help to sustain or destabilize
particular regimes. Sustain, if a regime gets to allocate the resources
to supporters, destabilizing if the resources end up in the hands of
opponents. This may sound overly dramatic, but the fact is that inter-
national aid represents very large proportions of government expendi-
ture and even GDP in many developing countries. The World Bank
ought to recognize this much more explicitly than it does.
There appear to be several potential approaches to taking on board
the political realities.
A. Mechanism Design
A natural approach to economists when faced with an incentive prob-
lem is to design an incentive compatible mechanism to deliver serv-
ices to the poor, taking into account the incentives of politicians. Much
of the implicit discussion of policy conditionality is in these terms
and there is a small literature which takes this perspective (e.g. Drazen,
2002). A possible way for the World Bank to solve political problems
is to design an incentive compatible way of helping the poor.
I doubt that this is a feasible way of making policy pro-poor. The
main problem is that neither the Bank nor academics understand poli-
tics well enough to actually be able to design such a mechanism. With-
out a full understanding one risks making things much worse. To see
this consider the following example from Coate and Morris (1999).
They argue that if politicians in developing countries are self-inter-
ested and maximizing subject to the relevant set of political constraints,
then any observed redistribution must be cost minimizing. If the World
Bank or another IFIs comes along and attempts to change the pattern
of redistribution by imposing conditionality this does not alter the
fundamental structure of political power. Therefore rulers still have to55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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redistribute as before. If they cannot do this using the instruments that
they were initially using then they will have to do this in another way,
which may be socially more costly if the initial situation was con-
strained efficient (van de Walle, 1993, for an interesting example and
many insights).
An important example of this type of phenomena comes from the re-
cent political science literature on the politics of policy reform in Latin
America. The consensus amongst scholars here (Gibson, 1997,
Roberts, 1995, Roberts and Arce, 1998, Weyland, 2002) is that in prac-
tice the application of the ‘Washington Consensus’ was politics as
usual. In the hands of Menem or Fujimori, privatization, deregulation
and market reforms could all be structured in a way as to reward sup-
porters and punish opponents. Of course the change in policy necessi-
tated some re-orientation. For example, the Peronist party in Argentina
had to abandon their long-running commitment to promote the inter-
ests of trade unions, but the shift in political coalitions did nothing to
alter the fundamental political attractiveness of clientelism. This lit-
erature again suggests how extraordinarily difficult it is to design poli-
tician-proof policy. The designers of the Washington consensus
certainly saw these policies as reducing the scope for inefficiencies
and patronage. Unfortunately this is difficult to achieve when the un-
derlying political equilibrium is unaltered.
Even worse implications than this come from the work of Reno (1998)
and Herbst (1990b) who suggest that structural adjustment, by de-
stroying the ability of African elites to use patronage to stay in power,
led to a switch to repression and violence.
B. Universalistic, Blunt Policy
In a first-best world the best thing would be to target resources to the
poor to improve their welfare. If the World Bank does not have a
detailed understanding of the relevant political constraints then one
idea is to design policies which are robust to broad types of political
pathologies and which do not rest on the details of specific cases. I
think there is much to be said for this idea.
The key thing is to design policies that are attractive to broad coali-
tions of citizens not just the poor. There is interesting evidence on this42 42 42 42 42
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issue from the literature on the European welfare state, at least on the
question of sustainability. This shows that policies which benefit the
middle classes are much harder politically to re-trench than those that
simply benefit the poor. One imagines that the same is true about the
introduction of the policies in the first place.
What are these policies? I’m a bit unsure in this context. Reinikke and
Svensson (2004) show that in Uganda only 13% of central educa-
tional spending gets through to the schools, the rest is ‘political
leakage’. Could this have been solved by designing the policy more
broadly? I am not sure that this can be done in ways that stop politi-
cians targeting.
C. Unconditional Aid
If it is impossible to design any incentive compatible policy, if the
political constraints are just too difficult to circumvent than an option
is just to forget about conditionality. As I argued in the introduction,
ultimately we care about welfare. The research of Burnside and Dol-
lar (2001a,b, 2004) basically shows that good governments use aid to
further development goals, while bad governments do not (though
see Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004). However, there is no evi-
dence that development goals are thwarted by aid even when there is
a bad government.
Of course one could conclude from this that aid should just be given
to good governments. However, I’m not sure if this is the correct nor-
mative conclusion to draw and it is probably irrelevant as a positive
conclusion since we know that political criteria gets used to allocate
aid (e.g. Alesina and Weder, 1999). My guess is that even giving aid
to bad governments promotes welfare and is probably better than noth-
ing. Though of course one could argue that inducing a ‘crisis’ by cut-
ting off aid might induce policy reform the recent experiences of aid
embargoes to Kenya and Zimbabwe suggest that the more likely out-
come is that things will get worse for the poor.
Finally, as I noted above, the evidence of Reno (1998) and Herbst
(1990b) suggests that the Bank really has to think about the counter-
factual here. If cutting off aid leads to civil was or ‘warlordism’ then
things are definitely going to get worse for the poor.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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D. Bypass the Roadblock
Another tack, discussed often by the World Bank and in particular in
the WDR 2004 is to bypass politics and go strait to the poor. This,
presumably is what NGOs do. Most people are rightly is skeptical
about this. There are many examples which suggest that in any case
this doesn’t work and it seems clear that this destroys state capacity,
just the thing you need to build. This does not seem like a long term or
desirable solution.
E. Promoting Good Governments (not Good Governance)
If we can’t calculate politician-proof policies, inaction is not enough,
and circumventing the government infeasible or undesirable, then the
World Bank can try to change the political equilibrium. Actually, since
anything the World Bank does may potentially change the political
equilibrium I don’t think there is any escape from this. I believe then
that it is better to think about this clearly and try to articulate the ways
in which this may happen.
As I hoped to demonstrate with the discussion of Botswana, if you get
the political equilibrium right then you solve many problems which
seem distinct. But how to move the political equilibrium is a desirable
direction? The most obvious thing is to increase the political power of
the poor. There are two obvious approaches to this. First, help the
poor solve the collective action problem. Second, give the poor ac-
cess to more information. I don’t think that either of these are neces-
sary or sufficient to improve policy for the poor, but they almost
certainly help. In my estimation this is a probably more reliable way
of improving policy than trying to politician proof.
Why is it legitimate to discuss increasing the political influence of the
poor but not discuss the political equilibrium more generally? On the
margin, giving the poor more information may help them make poli-
ticians accountable, but it is probably hard to sustain without formal
political representation, parties, changes in political institutions. As I
noted above, the big stylized fact in the political science literature
about the collapse of clientelism involves particular types of political44 44 44 44 44
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parties. We need to investigate this more and the types of social con-
ditions that allow these parties to come into existence.
There are no simple answers about how to design institutions which
create a good political equilibrium, but it is clear that what is required
are interventions which alter the whole political equilibrium in a de-
sirable direction. We need to think about what these are and find a
better way of characterizing the institutions, interests and forces that
lead to good political equilibria. This is a highly dissatisfying place to
end this paper but in lieu of hard results, I am advocating a conceptual
approach that I find altogether more useful than politician-proofing.
V. Conclusion
In the introduction to this paper I noted that the World Bank has dif-
ferent objectives from the governments with which it has to deal. For
example, the World Bank does not care about the re-election prob-
abilities of governments. Actually, we now see that this is probably
not true. If there are two political parties in a country, one pro-poor
and one pro-rich, effective poverty reduction almost surely necessi-
tates the pro-poor party being in power. This is the political reality.
Even if there is a pro-rich party it is possible that the World Bank
could work with it, in some sense designing politician-proof policies
that, despite the proclivities of the government in power, still got
through to the poor. Such an exercise is however fraught with diffi-
culties, second-best problems and complicated general equilibrium
effects and our general ignorance of how politics works in most devel-
oping countries. My conclusion is that ultimately politician-proofing
policies won’t work. Promoting the political success of the pro-poor
party is almost certainly the more effective route to poverty reduction.
Nevertheless there are clear dangers in this since one may simply re-
place a pro-rich clientelism with a pro-poor one. History certainly
suggests this is possible, even though typically it is the rich who domi-
nate. One interesting example in the Peruvian junta of General Velasco
after 1968 which instigated a slew of radical pro-poor policies. An-
other is the pro-poor clientelistic regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.55 PRIMER SEMESTRE DE 2005
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These examples suggest however that in the end apparently pro-poor
clientelism may not be that much better for the poor than pro-rich or
pro-middle class clientelism.
At the end of the day clientelism is clientelism and what is really
needed is a switch to a completely different style of political compe-
tition and public policy making. I surveyed the academic literature on
this which is lamentably incomplete. Although there are many frag-
mented ideas about the structural conditions that lead to clientelism
there is one big stylized fact that desperately needs to be understood-
clientelism collapsed when new political parties mobilize outside the
existing political system. Whether this is the Labour party in nine-
teenth century Britain, the Communist party in post World War II Italy,
or the Workers Party in Brazil, these parties, cut off from the spigots
of patronage, either commit themselves to, or learn to, compete in
different, and socially preferable ways. Their triumph leads to large
changes in the nature of political competition.
More generally, the World Bank needs to allocate resources to trying
to understand the types of forces and lead to the emergence of a good
political equilibrium. This is a research agenda with a vast intellec-
tual and practical payoff.
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